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I. INTRODUCTION
As a communist state, religion remains closely regulated in China. But
despite common understandings among many Americans, it is not true that
Christianity is illegal in China. To be sure, one must be a member of the
Communist Party (and therefore a professed atheist) to be in the highest
levels of the central government, and the government does closely monitor
the religious activities of China's residents, but there are hundreds of
thousands of legal Christians in China-and even more "unregistered"
Christians. Although reliable estimates are notoriously hard to come by (in
part because of this combination of registered and unregistered believers), it
is reasonable to assume that there are between 35 and 110 million Christians
in China's 1.3 billion member population.' And there are also many
. Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University. J.D., M.Div., Emory University; B.A.,
Abilene Christian University. These remarks were initially presented as a lecture at Fuller
Theological Seminary's "Forum on China's New Religious Regulations" in 2005; an abbreviated
version of that lecture was later presented at the Christian Scholar's Conference at Pepperdine
University. This paper intentionally retains the general characteristics and length of those brief
lectures, with only slight updating and some interspersing of footnotes for reference purposes. I am
grateful to Eric Carlson and Danny Yu for their comments on an earlier draft, and also to Jeralin
Cardoso and the other editors and staff of the Pepperdine Law Review for their graciousness in
bringing these remarks to print.
1. See International Religious Freedom Report 2005 (China), U.S. State Department (released
by Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51509.
believers of other faiths, including Buddhism, Islam, Taoism, and folk
religions.2 With such high numbers of religious believers in an avowedly
atheist state, it is unsurprising that the Communist Party would "prefer[] to
co-opt and harness religion rather than to fight it."
3
One of the main ways that China has sought to harness religion is to
require official state registration by religious groups. Five religious groups
or categories have been officially recognized by the Chinese government:
Buddhism, Catholicism, 4 Taoism, Islam, and Protestantism. (Official
Protestantism in China is usually known as the Three-Self Patriotic
Movement, or TSPM).5 Existing alongside these five, monolithic registered
groups are a host of unregistered Chinese religious groups (such as Christian
"house churches" and the like). Adherents of these unregistered groups are
frequently in danger of persecution by virtue of their religion, as they
operate outside the bounds of the law. Of course, these groups often refuse
to register precisely because they are unwilling and unable to give even tacit
approval to the state's policies regarding the promotion of communism, or
because they are unwilling to permit possible state interference in their
internal religious teachings, or because they are unwilling to join the tenets
of the five permissible registered groups.
htm (last visited July 10, 2006); see also Jason Kindopp, Policy Dilemmas in China's Church-State
Relations: An Introduction, in GOD AND CAESAR IN CHINA 1, 2 & nn.2-3 (Jason Kindopp & Carol
Lee Hamrin eds., 2004) (estimating 12 million Catholics and 45-60 million Protestants in 2000). For
a slightly varying estimate, including all religious adherents (and not just Christians), see Eric R.
Carlson, China's New Regulations on Religion: A Small Step, Not a Great Leap, Forward, 2005
BYU L. REv. 747, 771 (2005) (listing about 200 million religious believers in China, and contending
that only about 140 million belong to registered religious groups).
2. International Religious Freedom Report 2005, supra note 1.
3. Carlson, supra note 1, at 749.
4. As discussed below, Catholicism as recognized by the Chinese government is not necessarily
co-extensive with normal conceptions of Roman Catholicism under the direction of the Pope. See,
e.g., Breffni O'Rourke, China: Mixed Signals on Catholic Appointments Hint at Internal Policy
Differences, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, May 17, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/
featuresarticle/2006/5/FB42 1 B58-2180-4704-8B9D-A586D24D7951 .html (last visited June 7, 2006)
(discussing tensions between China and the Vatican over China's ordination of "Catholic" bishops
without the official consent and blessing of the pope); China Names New Catholic Bishop, BBC
NEWS (May 7, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4982530.stm (last visited June 7, 2006)
(same). The Chinese government believes that Rome is a foreign power and therefore is wary of
allowing papal control over the local Chinese Catholic congregations.
5. See Yihua Xu, "Patriotic" Protestants: The Making of an Official Church, in GOD AND
CAESAR IN CHINA, supra note 1, at 107.
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On November 30, 2004, China's State Council promulgated a new set of
regulations governing internal religious affairs in China.6 These new
"Regulations on Religious Affairs" became effective March 1, 2005'- and
presumably supplanted and replaced a host of provincial and local
regulations touching upon religion in China. While China does not have a
"federal" system in the same way that the United States does, it appears to
most scholars that the plain intent of the new regulations was to be supreme
over all the land. Indeed, the primary goal of Chinese officials in passing
the regulations was "to help expand government management of religious
affairs."'8
These new regulations on religion must be analyzed and assessed on
their face, for there are not yet any "implementing guidelines," which are
often issued to interpret the meaning of regulations for the local officials
who must enforce them. Further, these new regulations do not have any
impact on religious foreigners in China (e.g., missionaries), who remain
governed by Decrees 144 and 145.9 Although it is often stated that such
persons are not allowed to evangelize in China (and indeed, it would be
illegal to do so under applicable law), such foreigners are often asked to
"teach" at universities--often with a wink and a nod from local officials
who know that there is more going on than just the usual academic
instruction. While this "sometime" enforcement of the law' ° is quite
problematic and troubling for foreign missionaries (in that what was once
6. Carlson, supra note 1, at 747 & n.3. See generally James Tong, A New Framework for State-
Religion Relations: The Regulations on Religious Affairs of China, March 2005, http://www.
christianityinchina.org/download/forumpacketfinal.pdf, at 5-19 (last visited July 10, 2006)
(discussing the legislative and political events involved in promulgating the regulations, and
discussing the process for educating local officials about the new regulations).
7. Regulations on Religious Affairs (Decree of the State Council of the People's Republic of
China, No. 426), English translation reproduced in Carlson, supra note 1, at 782-97 [hereinafter
Regulations]. For alternative translations of the Regulations, see sources cited at Carlson, supra note
1, at 782 n.136.
8. United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report of the U.S.
Commission on International Religious Freedom, http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/publications/
currentreport/2006annualRpt.pdf#page=19 (2006), at 26 [hereinafter USCIRF Report] (last visited
June 28, 2006).
9. See Regulations Governing the Religious Activities of Foreign Nationals Within China
(1994), http://www.chinaculture.org/gb/en.aboutchina/2003-09/24/content_24874.htm (last visited
July 6, 2006) (representing Decree 144 as signed by Premier Li Peng on Jan. 31, 1994); Regulation
Governing Venues for Religious Activities, http://www.chinaculture.org/gb/en_aboutchina/2003-
09/24/content_24884.htm (last visited July 6, 2006) (representing Decree 145 as signed by Premier
Li Peng on Jan. 31, 1994).
10. Lawrence A. Uzzell, Statement at the Hearing of the United States Commission on
International Religious Freedom (February 7, 2005), http://users.sisqtel.net/cliles/IRFW/archives/
2005/2005-03-01.htm (last visited July 13, 2006).
protected may soon be unprotected, without any change in the written law),
further discussion of foreign religious missionaries must wait until another
day.
While I am admittedly not an expert on China, there are some tools at
my disposal that may nonetheless yield useful insights into assessing the
new regulations. Specifically, there are two vantage points-two rubrics or
templates, if you will-that I will offer to look at these new regulations on
religion. In the title, I have called these two "lenses," for they provide two
varying (but sometimes overlapping) ways to view the regulations. Using
these lenses provides important insight into import and impact of the
regulations for the citizens of China. The two lenses are: (1) theology and
(2) international human rights law. About nine years ago, in an analogous
context, I was assessing a new set of laws regulating religion in Russia and
wrote, "In situations [like this], we would be wise to remember that human
rights law cannot provide all of the answers when theology is so deeply
implicated."" Accordingly, at that time I focused almost exclusively on
providing a theological framework through which a new set of regulations
on religion could be understood. In Section II below, I will again heed my
own advice and offer theology as the first lens through which to view the
regulations.
But, while not distancing myself too much from that statement, my
intention and focus here is largely to turn it on its head. Thus, in Section III,
I proffer that international human rights laws can provide a useful point of
departure in assessing the efficacy or offensiveness of the new Chinese law,
even though theology is strongly implicated. The reason for my shift in
emphasis is simple: for the Russian law, I was writing in a group of mostly
lawyers assessing the law under the auspices of Emory Law School. In that
context, I feared that the scholars were using human rights language to
critique the new law while failing to adequately take into account theological
rationales and perspectives. For this Chinese law, I have been asked as a
law professor to discuss the law with a number of theologians under the
auspices of Fuller Theological Seminary. This explains my heightened
concern for stressing the norms of the international community (as expressed
in human rights documents) as a benchmark for assessment purposes;
however, I certainly do not intend to eschew theology and will contend that
it has an important role to play in assessing the impact of the law.
After describing what these two lenses have to offer, Section IV briefly
addresses a few of the more controversial and troubling aspects of the
regulations. To be fair, there is much to be praised in the new regulations, as
they appear on paper to be a significant progressive step-especially if they
are interpreted in favorable ways. In that vein, Section V will offer a few
11. Joel A. Nichols, Mission, Evangelism, and Proselytism in Christianity: Mainline Conceptions
as Reflected in Church Documents, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 563, 656 (1998).
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concluding observations for moving forward in ways that will promote the
rule of law generally, and particularly with respect to religious freedom for
believers in China.
II. THE FIRST LENS: THEOLOGY
Literally translated, "theology" addresses "words or sayings about
God." But this definition is too limited, for we commonly think about
theology as a ground of religious explanation for actions. On a larger scale,
we often think of theology as informing our decisions about things from
polity or church structure to style of worship, to more core beliefs like
doctrines of salvation, sin, grace, and the atonement. For example, a local
group of Catholic believers desires to maintain connections with bishops,
cardinals, and the Pope not out of personal feelings of attachment to those
men, but because of deeply held theological beliefs about ecclesiology and
church polity. They sincerely believe that the Pope is the Vicar of Christ,
the successor to Peter, the one who is quite literally the head of the church.
This is plainly a "theological" belief. It is clear that we should be able to say
quite comfortably that a government cannot (or at least should not) dictate
the internal theology of the local Catholic church by telling it that it must
disassociate from Rome and the Pope. Nonetheless, throughout history
governments have struggled with allowing local religious believers to
submit themselves to a "foreign power" such as the Pope; indeed this
remains an ongoing problem in China under the new regulations.
A host of other examples could easily be adduced to illustrate other
theological beliefs that are potentially subject to governmental interference.
One might imagine these on a continuum from individual, personal religious
belief and practice, moving to group religious practice, and then moving to
external interaction with non-believers. Such theological beliefs would
include, among others: (1) an obligation to believe what one wants, and to
worship God in particular ways or methods set forth by relevant religious
texts, traditions, or other dictates; (2) an obligation to meet regularly
(usually weekly) with one's fellow believers (and the attendant right to
decide for oneself who those fellow believers are); or (3) an obligation to
engage the outside world, such as providing assistance to the poor. This last
example involves the interaction of the believers with the world around
them, and highlights the theological need for religious groups to have the
same access and ability to establish non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
as other groups. While governmental regulation should be more permissible
by degrees at this outer boundary, the entire spectrum is laden with internal
theological beliefs.
It may be illustrative, in order to indicate the potential impact that laws
may have on theological beliefs, to delve more carefully into one topic. 2
By way of example, consider evangelism (which nears the end of the
spectrum where a religious group's beliefs impact the world around them).
The spreading of the faith is critical for every faith tradition. If one
generation fails to pass on their beliefs to the next generation, the faith
tradition will die. If members of a faith tradition fail to share their beliefs
with persons who hold different (or no) beliefs, the faith tradition cannot
grow. For Christians, these two avenues of faith transmission (intemally, to
the children, and externally, to non-Christians) similarly must not be
neglected for the purpose of propagating their beliefs. But faith transmission
is also important because of theological and scriptural mandates, as
Christians are commanded both to teach their children and to "make
disciples" of non-believers. 13 Historically, there have been several different
words used to describe this effort: witness (martyria), proselytism, mission,
evangelism. Similarly, there have been a number of methods advocated for
spreading the faith: proclamation, witness, Eucharistic celebration, social
activism, martyrdom, and, unfortunately, even the use of force. While there
is wide consensus in modem times against the use of force for conversion,
there remains a surprising lack of unanimity on appropriate methods of
evangelism.
For the four main groups of Christians, 14 there are differing emphases
and understandings of "mission" or "evangelism," which may lead to
differing activities or methods of evangelism. Catholics stress that
proclamation of the Gospel is a useful beginning point, but mission must
also include social action, including the notion of liberation and the
advocacy of political and economic freedom. All those bom into the Church
and baptized as infants are considered Christians, and it is the responsibility
of the Church to nurture the faith of those persons as well as to spread the
Gospel to other lands. Evangelical Protestants perceive of evangelism
primarily as proclamation-in large measure because for evangelicals an
individual's relationship with God is considered primary, personal, and
grounded in individual intellectual commitment to certain truths.
Evangelicals take the Great Commission of Matthew 28 very literally and
believe that every individual in every nation needs to be told the Gospel
12. The following three paragraphs draw heavily on Nichols, supra note 11.
13. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 6:7 (NRSV) ("Recite [these words] to your children and talk about
them when you are at home and when you are away, when you lie down and when you rise.");
Matthew 28:19-20 (NRSV) ("Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the
name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and teaching them to obey everything that I
have commanded you.").
14. These four main groups are Roman Catholicism, Evangelical Protestantism, the Conciliar
Ecumenical Movement, and Eastern Orthodoxy. Nichols, supra note 11, at 567 (citing NEW
DIRECTIONS IN MISSION AND EVANGELIZATION 1: BASIC STATEMENTS, 1974-1991 (James A.
Scherer & Stephan B. Bevans eds., 1992)).
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message so that they will have the personal opportunity to make an
individual commitment. The Conciliar Ecumenical movement (mostly
typified by mainline Protestantism) focuses more on ecumenism and unity
among Christian churches than on proclamation. Not only is evangelism
thought to occur through proclamation, but also through Eucharistic
celebration, social action, and prayer. This movement especially decries any
perceived "competition" among Christian groups for evangelistic candidates
and places more emphasis on working with existing and indigenous
Christian groups. Eastern Orthodox churches have a well-defined theology
that undergirds their stance on evangelism, stressing unity and Eucharistic
celebration more than evangelistic proclamation. For Orthodox believers,
membership in the church is often connected to belonging to a particular
body of people and frequently tied to ethnic or nationalistic groups. The
Eucharist and social witness of the church are seen as the prime ways of
sharing the Gospel, while proclamation is relegated to an equal or even
subordinate role. Any interreligious competition is especially decried.
Drawing upon these varying understandings of evangelism, different
Christian communities may place emphasis on the act of verbally sharing the
Gospel with strangers, the act of celebrating Eucharist weekly in
community, or the act of providing food and shelter to those in need. But
regardless of the manifestation of evangelism by a particular Christian
community (deriving from their varying theologies), it cannot be
overemphasized that there is no disagreement about the need for evangelism
in general and that the basis for evangelism is theological. It is therefore
imperative that China's government appreciate this "lens" of theology,
understanding that the Christian religion itself mandates the spreading of the
faith, so that it can legislate accordingly. It is critical that allowance be
made for Christians (and other religious believers) to raise their own
children in accordance with their faith and to share their faith with non-
believers as their theology commands. This is not to say that there is an
unfettered right to impose one's beliefs on another person, for the right to
attempt to convince people to change their religious beliefs stands in tension
with the other person's rights to privacy and to be left alone. But the
difficulty of striking this delicate balance should not be used to justify
outlawing the theologically-mandated sharing of one's faith through
appropriate means.
III. THE SECOND LENS: INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
The second lens through which we should view China's new religious
regulations is international human rights law. 5 While "law" can have a
number of different definitions, it is best understood for our present purposes
as a means of social ordering. The "international" aspect of international
human rights law widens the vantage point to view the entire world
community ordering itself as it defines, establishes, or reiterates norms.
And, as discussed below, freedom to maintain, change, or practice a religion
is a human rights issue. Thus, international human rights law is useful as a
measuring stick, or a benchmark, by which lawyers and other observers may
assess proposed or current laws touching upon religion.
International human rights law respecting religion or belief includes two
key components: freedom of conscience and freedom of exercise. 16
Freedom of conscience may roughly be described as a person's freedom to
believe and hold whatever theological beliefs she wants. Freedom of
exercise is the right to act upon those beliefs dictated by one's conscience.
Freedom of conscience is known as "non-derogable" at international law,
meaning that no one (whether a state or individual) may lawfully take it
away or restrict it at all under any circumstances. 17 By contrast, freedom of
exercise may be restricted in some circumstances, but only upon "necessary
and proportionate" grounds.18 This means that persons have the right to act
out their religious beliefs unless the government restricts them; the
government is permitted to restrict such action only when it is absolutely
necessary to "protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others."' 9 An analogous way to think
about this concept in terms more familiar to American lawyers is that the
free exercise of religion may be regulated, but will be subject to something
akin to "strict scrutiny. ' '20 That is, any regulation restricting the practice of
religion must derive from a compelling state interest (or a reason for the
government to intervene at all) and the governmental intervention must use
the least restrictive means possible (it must restrict the right of exercise in
the most minimal way possible).2' One thing notably absent from these
international law guidelines is any mention of the necessity of
15. See generally NATAN LERNER, RELIGION, BELIEFS, AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
(2000).
16. See JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 238
(2d. ed. 2005); see also LERNER, supra note 15, at 10.
17. WITTE, supra note 16, at 237.
18. Id.
19. E.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 18,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
20. See WITTE, supra note 16, at 235.
21. Cf Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita, 126 S. Ct. 1211, 1216-17 (2006) (describing strict scrutiny
test, in case law and in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (b)).
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disestablishing a church. While the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution contains free exercise and disestablishment as its two
touchstones, international law does not conclusively specify that an
established religion is contrary to the freedom of religion or belief.
22
Also of key importance at international law is that rights to freedom of
religion and belief are not solely individual rights, but also group (or
collective) rights. Thus, not only does an individual have a right to make a
pilgrimage to a particular place at a particular time, but a community of like-
minded believers also has the right to travel together. Or more commonly, a
community of believers has rights to gather at a set time, to worship in
certain collective ways, to hold property in common, to exclude some people
from their assembly, and the like. The collective nature of religious rights is
important, because it is unusual for most religious rights to be practiced in
pure solitude.
International law also takes into account the varying theologies of
evangelism discussed previously. For example, another key feature of
international law regarding religion or belief is the right to "have or to
adopt" a belief of one's choosing.23 This language is widely interpreted to
embody a right to change one's belief, in addition to holding or adopting it.
And if there is a right to believe, and a right to change one's belief, then
there is necessarily a right to evangelize in order to convince others
regarding religious beliefs. But just as theology must admit that evangelism
may be tempered by legitimate regulation so as to respect the privacy of
others, so too international law counterbalances the freedom to change one's
belief (and to evangelize) with the other person's right to be left alone and to
be free from "coercion. 24 This balancing admits of the possibility of some
government intervention (to prevent "coercion") but makes clear that the
right to propagate one's faith remains generally undeterred. Further, the
right of parents to educate their children in the faith is explicitly protected
from state interference.25
The rights mentioned above are primarily delineated in three places in
international documents. The first adumbration of these rights is in the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.26 While not a binding treaty, the
sentiments embodied therein are generally thought to be a good articulation
22. Steven D. Smith, Intramural Dialogue and the Malaise of Religious Freedom, 35 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 359, 364 (reviewing LAW AND RELIGION (Rex J. Ahdar ed. 2000)).
23. ICCPR, supra note 19, at art. 18.
24. Id.; see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (I1), art. 18 (Dec. 10,
1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration] (discussing the right to "change ... religion or belief').
25. ICCPR, supra note 19, at art. 18.
26. See Universal Declaration, supra note 24.
of human rights that should be respected by all governments. Article 18 of
the Universal Declaration declares: "Everyone has the right to freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion; this right includes freedom to change his
religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and
in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice,
worship and observance. 27
The second document that elaborates these rights is the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) ["ICCPR"]. The ICCPR is a
convention to which states can bind themselves-but the status of China is a
bit unclear. China has signed the ICCPR but has not yet ratified it.
28
Without such ratification, China is bound by the ICCPR only to the extent
that it codifies customary international law. But China's signature itself
obligates China to refrain from taking "any actions that would run counter to
the object and purpose" of the ICCPR until China either ratifies or disavows
it. 29 The ICCPR follows up on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
and spells out the rights discussed above.3 °
The third international document that elaborates the rights of religious
persons in China is the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief.3 ' The 1981
Declaration does not have the status of a treaty, but is effectively a
restatement of the basic human rights of freedom of religion and belief. It is
accordingly applicable to all states, including China. While not formally
binding by enforcement, it is quite useful as a benchmark to assess a state's
compliance with international standards on freedom of religion or belief.
One way to measure such compliance comes through the United Nations
Special Rapporteur, appointed by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights
specifically to monitor compliance with issues under the 1981 Declaration.
3 2
27. Id. at art. 18.
28. Natasha Parassram Concepcion, Human Rights Violations Against Muslims in the Xinjiang
Uighur Autonomous Regions of Western China, 8 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 19,20 (2000).
29. Id. at 21.
30. ICCPR, supra note 19, at art. 18.
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This
right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and
freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to
adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as
are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals
or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of
parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education
of their children in conformity with their own convictions.
Id.
31. G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/55 (Nov. 25, 1982).
32. See Abdelfattah Amor, The Mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REv.
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The 1981 Declaration addresses a number of specific rights in some detail,
including: the right to worship (including the right to assemble); the right to
maintain and establish places for such worship; the right to establish and
maintain charitable and humanitarian institutions; the right to speak and
write about one's faith; the right to solicit voluntary financial contributions;
the right to train and educate clergy; and the right to establish and maintain
communications with fellow believers at both the national and international
levels. aa
These and other elucidations of religious human rights are useful in very
practical ways in protecting the rights of religious believers in various
countries. One recent example is the case of Ake Green. 4 Green is a pastor
in Sweden who was imprisoned for preaching to his own congregation about
sexual morality-specifically for condemning homosexual behavior during a
sermon to his congregants in 2003. 3' The authorities viewed this as
contravening Swedish laws that prohibited discrimination or ill speech
(incitement) on the basis of sexual orientation, despite the fact that Green
never advocated violence of any kind toward homosexuals. Green was
initially convicted, but in 2005 his conviction was overturned on appeal.
The legal reasoning in the case turned, in large part, on Article 18 of the
ICCPR and the incompatibility of punishing Green for speaking his religious
beliefs. Whatever one thinks of the contents of Green's views, the case
underscores the advantages of having measurable international benchmarks
for religious rights.
Among Christian groups-and especially conservative, evangelical
Christian communities-there is often a surprising resistance to endorsing
human rights, including religious human rights. There are at least three
reasons to adopt and use the language and mechanisms of the modern human
rights regime for religion and belief, which are at least partially illustrated by
the Green case. First, evangelical Christians should care about human rights
for purely "parochial" reasons.3 6 That is, it is in one's self-interest to look
out for religious human rights of others, for it helps ensure that one's own
rights to speak, believe, and worship will concomitantly be protected.
Second, and more importantly, human rights are important of their own
945-50 (1998) (describing how the Special Rapporteur provides a general survey and specific on-site
evaluations of member states of the United Nations).
33. G.A. Res. 36/55, at art. 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/55 (Nov. 25, 1982).
34. See, e.g., The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Sweden - Criminalizing Religious Speech -
Ake Green, http://www.becketfund.org/index.php/case/93.html (last visited July 10, 2006).
35. Id.
36. ALLEN HERTZKE, FREEING GOD'S CHILDREN: THE UNLIKELY ALLIANCE FOR GLOBAL
HUMAN RIGHTS 36 (2004),
accord. Human rights derive from the notion that there are certain rights that
inhere in people simply because they are human. A basic respect for human
dignity virtually compels this conclusion-and, in Christian terms, a
theological respect for the creation of humans in the image of God logically
and necessarily leads to the same result.3 7 Third, religious rights may well
be thought of as an embodiment of all human rights, for within religious
rights are the right to assemble, the right to speak, the right to be free from
deprivation without due process of law, the right to be free from
governmental control, and the like.
Despite the importance of this catalog of religious rights, there is little
by way of accountability structures in place in the international community.
Instead, monitoring and enforcement of these religious rights are left mostly
to independent countries (and, to some extent, the Special Rapporteur).3"
Since 1998, the United States has maintained a special commission on
religious freedom whose purpose is to monitor the status of freedom of
religion and belief vis-d-vis the benchmarks of international law, and to
issue independent policy recommendations to the United States.39 While
these annual reports are not binding, they do influence United States' policy
and are oftentimes a useful point of reference and a catalyst for discussion
between the United States and other countries. With respect to China, the
latest Commission report was quite critical of the regulation of religion
overall, including criticism of the 2005 regulations.40 In addition to the
pressure from the United States government (including the Commission
reports), other governments, and non-governmental monitoring
organizations, China also has other strong incentives at the moment to
conform to international norms on religious freedom, including the attention
garnered by the upcoming 2008 Olympics in Beijing and the increased
scrutiny of its human rights record in connection with China's recent
admittance to the World Trade Organization.4' While these reasons alone
do not ensure full compliance with international norms, the time is ripe for
China to align itself more fully with the international community on matters
of freedom of religion and belief. The lens of international human rights law
can be a helpful aid in evaluating whether that alignment is occurring.
37. See Genesis 1:26 (NRSV) ("Then God said, 'Let us make humankind in our image,
according to our likeness."').
38. See, e.g., Peng Liu, Unreconciled Differences: The Staying Power of Religion, in GOD AND
CAESAR IN CHINA, supra note 1, at 149, 154-58 (discussing dialogue between Canadian and Chinese
officials regarding religious freedom, and between Norwegian and Chinese officials).
39. See USCIRF Report, supra note 8.
40. See id.
41. See Kim-Kwong Chan, China's Socioeconomic Changes and the Implications for the
Religion-State Dynamic in China, 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 325, 325 (2004).
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IV. LOOKING THROUGH THE LENSES AT CHINA'S NEW LAW
Using these dual lenses of theology and international human rights law
yields a set of insights that might prove useful in assessing the tone and
effect of the new law and any forthcoming accompanying implementing
regulations. I do not propose to grant a comprehensive assessment of the
regulations, as some others have already begun to do.42 And in this short
space I cannot even do justice to the regulations just through these two
lenses (leaving aside many historical, cultural, and political arguments that
must be addressed). But it is nonetheless useful to highlight some
provisions that appear particularly problematic as written or as potentially
interpreted. While it is likely that China will issue implementing guidelines
to assist local officials in interpreting and carrying out these regulations, no
such implementing guidelines have been issued to date. In fact, it appears
that the implementing guidelines for Shanghai for the 2005 regulations were
withdrawn after reservations were raised by the United States Commission
on International Religious Freedom and by international legal scholars. The
U.S. Commission further plans "to offer Chinese officials a detailed analysis
of the new regulations and to compare them with international human rights
standards regarding the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or
belief.' 43 That process will hopefully prove useful and yield more salutary
interpretations and clarifications that both accord fully with prevailing
international norms and also respect the various theologies of the sundry
religions.
Registration. The new regulations require religious organizations to
register with the state, which necessarily implies some level of state control
over the activities. 44  There are also detailed provisions regarding the
registration of venues for gathering for religious activities and collecting
religious donations.45  The notion of registering at all is a severe problem
and hindrance for many religions, especially for those denominations who
want to keep the government out of the internal affairs of the church. Given
China's history of suppressing religious groups, there may be good reason to
refrain from cooperating too closely with the government-both for internal
42. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 1; Lauren Homer, The New Regulation on Religious Affairs in
China: A Legal Analysis (April 7, 2005), http://www.christianityinchina.org/download/
forumpacketfinal.pdf, at 92-123; cf Carolyn Evans, Chinese Law and the International Protection of
Religious Freedom, 44 J. CHURCH & STATE 749 (2002) (assessing China's policies toward religion
up to 2002 in light of international human rights instruments respecting freedom of religion).
43. See USCIRF Report, supra note 8, at 26.
44. See Regulations, supra note 7, at 783-84, art. 6.
45. Id. at 786-90, arts. 12-26.
theological reasons (such as believing that there is a clear distinction
between earthly and spiritual functions) and for practical and historical
reasons, such as a history of persecution. It seems especially likely that
evangelical Christian groups would be reticent to register, given their often
counter-majoritarian theology and their likely hesitation to cooperate too
closely with a state that is not known for welcoming divergent theological
belief and teaching. Members of currently unregistered house churches
would also be particularly likely to refrain from handing over the names of
members and leaders and meeting places (as is required under the
regulations) because of the government's history of imprisoning many house
church leaders and members.46 In short, there appears to be no obvious need
for required registration other than continued governmental control and
monitoring of churches.
A quite separate -concern, and not inconsequential, is the difficult
practical administration of registration. The regulations make no provision
for the length of time it will take churches to register, nor do they seem to
allow for any grace period.47 If the registration itself is at all difficult or
time-consuming, or if the government bureaucracy is inefficient in
processing the thousands of registrations, then churches may potentially be
penalized. It is unclear whether there is a grace period, whether the process
will be tedious, and whether there will be enough time to complete the task
even if religious groups should choose to undertake it.
Education. Religious education is also a problem under the new
regulations, as state approval is required. a Concerns about state control of
religious curriculum again arise, and it is readily apparent that the dictates of
both theology and international human rights law would mandate parental
control over the religious education of their children, without governmental
interference. 49 These detailed provisions for registration and state control of
religious schools run counter to such parental control.
The Ban Against "Foreign Influence. " The regulations seek to control
the inner workings of a church further by prohibiting "foreign forces" from
having control of religious affairs and requiring "independence." 50 This is
especially problematic for the Catholic Church, which is apparently
prohibited from looking to the Vatican for leadership, control, and
46. See USCIRF Report, supra note 8, at 22 (referring to "severe penalties" for unregistered
religious groups); see also Carlson, supra note 1, at 772 (identifying additional disincentives for
registration). See generally Regulations, supra note 7.
47. See Regulations, supra note 7, at 783-84, art. 6 (providing no specific time period within
which a "religious body" must register).
48. See id. at 784-85, art. 8 (requiring an "application," "examination," and "a decision of
approval or disapproval" by the religious affairs department of China's State Council); see also
Carlson, supra note 1, at 759 (detailing the procedure set out in Articles 8 and 9 for state approval).
49. See Regulations, supra note 7, at 785, art. 9 (listing six "conditions" that must be met in
order to establish formalized religious education).
50. See id. at 783, art. 4.
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ordination.5 1 This also presents problems for the Orthodox Christian
community in looking to external leadership and for Tibetan Buddhists in
looking to the Dalai Lama.
52
Religious Publications. The new regulations only allow religious
publications to be printed by state-approved agencies.5 3 Once again, this
keeps religious activities within the control of the state. In this case, the
state will have control over the content of religious brochures and
information, and it will also be able to control access to printing presses and
even the possible dissemination of literature. A further problem is that there
are logistically not enough state printing presses to keep up with demand,
meaning that presumably much of the religious literature will not be able to
be reproduced legally even when permissible by the state.
Evangelism. While not mentioned in the new regulations, evangelism by
foreigners continues to be disallowed under the 1994 law. 4 This directly
contradicts both the internal theology of religious groups as well as the
dictates of international law. Evangelism by Chinese citizens does not
appear to be addressed directly, but the regulations stress that citizens must
"respect each other and co-exist in harmony"5 5 and that religious
publications must not "jeopardize the harmonious co-existence between
religious and non-religious citizens. 56 Provisions such as these leave open
the possibility that many direct forms of evangelism will be disallowed.
Governmental Supervision of Religious Personnel, Doctrine, and
Practice. The new regulations give the government the authority to
"determine" whether religious leaders are qualified, as they must also be
registered with the government. 57  Thus, the government in this manner
potentially exercises one more set of controls on the theology and teachings
of religious groups by effectively having a veto over leadership positions.
This is obviously problematic from a church autonomy perspective, and runs
quite counter to the premise at international law that a religious group may
determine its own leadership.
51. See id.; see also id. at 791, art. 27 (assigning oversight of the ordination of Catholic bishops
to the State Council's religious affairs department); Carlson, supra note 1, at 771.
52. See Regulations, supra note 7, at 791, art. 27 (mandating that the "succession of living
Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism" be overseen and approved by certain governmental religious affairs
departments).
53. See id. at 784, art. 7.
54. See Regulations Governing the Religious Activities of Foreign Nationals Within China
(1994), http://www.chinaculture.org/gb/en-aboutchina/2003-09/24/content_24874.htm (last visited
July 6, 2006) (representing Decree 144 as signed by Premier Li Peng on Jan. 31, 1994).
55. See Regulations, supra note 7, at 782, art. 2.
56. Id. at 784, art. 7(1).
57. Id. at 790-91, art. 27; see also id. at 786, art. 12, 791, art. 28.
Other issues. There are some laudable omissions of potential
governmental control from the new regulations, but it is unclear what the
import of those omissions will be. For example, there is no mention of the
Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM). It is unclear, though, whether that
means that non-TSPM groups are qualified to register under the regulations,
or whether TSPM status is simply assumed even though not mentioned.
(That is, it is possible that Protestant groups not adhering to TSPM will not
even be allowed to register.)58 Further, there is no mention of the "five
recognized religions" previously discussed at Chinese law. Again, it is
unclear whether this means that other religious groups may be recognized at
law if they apply, or whether these five recognized religions remain the only
possible categories.
Several other concerns about vagueness in the regulations could be
raised as well. For example, while the regulations allow for "normal
religious activities," they do not clarify what "normal" means.5 9 In fact, the
regulations do not even include any definition of "religion" or "religious
belief." Further, it is not at all clear how likely it is that the state will
regulate other religious matters, or on what basis the state will deem
religious practices contrary to the "health, safety, and welfare" of the
country.6 ° In short, using the lenses of theology and international human
rights law provides an entire set of questions for which there are no ready
answers-and for which those answers that do exist appear to tend far too
much toward state control. China needs to address these and other
difficulties in the regulations as it attempts to respect religious beliefs and to
conform more closely to accepted international norms.
V. MOVING FORWARD
While it is neither my intention nor purpose to prescribe future changes
for China, I would be remiss if I did not make at least a few tentative
observations in conclusion. In addition to the concerns raised above, it is
imperative that China begin and continue to enact a series of structural
reforms with the objective of establishing a level of certainty respecting the
law. That is, China's purpose must be not just to comply with and conform
to international standards for purposes of World Trade Organization status,
or even to comply for its own inherent value, but, more fundamentally, to
58. For further developments on this issue, see Maureen Fan, In China, Churches Challenge the
Rules: Bold Congregations Risk Official Wrath, WASHINGTON POST, October 1, 2006, at Al9
(describing several house churches that have registered with the government but do not adhere
strictly to TSPM beliefs and practices, and are therefore in "a sort of legal netherworld").
59. See Regulations, supra note 7, at 783, art. 3.
60. For example, religious publications are disallowed in several circumstances, including if they
"jeopardize the harmony between different religions" or "discriminate against or insult religious or
non-religious citizens." Id. at 784, art. 7.
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move toward a system that is governed by the "rule of law" rather than "rule
by law." China must seek to further predictability and certainty in the law
and its application as opposed to creating "laws" that are used as after-the-
fact justifications for otherwise arbitrary government actions.61
Determining how to move toward greater governance by such rule of
law is not easy, but should include at least the following:
1. There is a need for precedent and certainty in the law, and groups
should know in advance what legal consequences might follow
from their decisions. Larry Uzzell recently observed that, in Russia,
"the rule of law is a sometime thing, whether the laws be libertarian
or repressive .... And formal laws and regulations seem irrelevant:
a congregation can be legally registered and have all its papers in
perfect order and still be denied access to public arenas. 62 This
seems equally true about China's laws on religion at present.
China's "sometime" enforcement leads to uncertainty, confusion,
and favoritism, and should be avoided.
2. There is a need to pass laws that are clear, and not vague. Or, in
the instant case, the implementing guidelines that aid the local
officials need to have enough detail that people know what will be
enforced. This is particularly true in a legal regime such as China
that forces religious groups to register.
3. There is a need for legal remedies if people are wrongly
prosecuted under the law.
4. There is a need for an independent judiciary. Citizens need to be
able to take comfort in the fact that laws will be equally and fairly
applied in a non-arbitrary fashion, and that the courts will act as a
check on other state actors. This can only occur if judges are
allowed to operate and make decisions independently of other state
organs, without fear of repercussions from those state organs and
organizations.
61. See, e.g., Randall Peerenboom, Let One Hundred Flowers Bloom, One Hundred Schools
Contend: Debating Rule of Law in China, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 471, 476 (2002); Carlson, supra note
1, at 747; USCIRF Report, supra note 8, at 26-28.
62. Uzzell, supra note 10.
5. China should move toward increasing its receptivity toward
comparative and international approaches in crafting and
interpreting its laws. This has begun to occur with these 2005
regulations on religions and is a salutary move.
6. Any restrictions on the free exercise of religion must be
necessary and proportionate, and commensurate with international
obligations.
7. Finally, and quite importantly, there is a need to move toward a
much greater general separation of government from religion.
Religious freedom will be more secure overall if the functions of the
state and religious groups are less intertwined. Among other things,
this will mean that religious groups should not have to register at
all. It will also mean that religions will be able to publish their own
literature (without state interference) and to instruct their children in
their faith as they see fit.
